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Joint-Ventures in the Soviet Union
Under the New Regime-Boom or Bust
Karl William Viehe*
I. INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to the decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics taken January 13, 1987,
the Counsel of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
issued a decree entitled "On the Establishment in the Territory of
the USSR an Operation of Joint-Ventures with the Participation of
Soviet Organizations and Firms from Capitalist and Developing
Countries."' The rich potential of the Soviet market, together with
the fundamental changes ,in thinking which seem to be increasingly
a real characteristic of the Gorbachev era, has piqued the interest of
many western firms. A conference was held this past June in Wash-
ington, D.C. at the International Law Institute among a number of
U.S. legal authorities on East-West trade, American businessmen
and -women, and a delegation of six scholarly lawyers from the
Institute for State and Law in Moscow to discuss the current status
* Karl 'William 'Viehe (B.A., M.A., J.D., M.L.T.) is a practicing attorney in Washington,
D.C., a graduate of the Gerogetown University Law Center, an Adjunct Professor at American
University teaching, among others, a course entitled "Crisis Managment for the Multinational
Enterprise" and Adjunct Professor at George Washington University where he teaches "In-
ternational Tax Law." Mr: Viehe has two decades experience in trading with Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union. The author gratefully wishes to acknowledge the many incisive contri-
butions of Sarah C. Carey, Esquire, of Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell, Washington,
D.C. and Thomas L. Shillinglaw, Division Counsel, Coming Glass Works, Chairman, ABA
Soviet and Eastern European Law Committee.
1. Translation by the Institute for State and Law, Civil Division of the Soviet Academy
of Sciences for use at the International Law Institute's Conference on the Soviet joint venture
law [hereinafter Decree of The USSR Council of Ministers] (although the original document
does not have numbered pages, citations in this article refer to them in numerical sequence);
see infra n. 3.
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of the joint-venture law recently promulgated. This article will discuss
a number of the findings which arose in the course of this conference. 2
The law requires that joint-ventures be controlled by the decree of
the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet dated January 13, 1987,
entitled "On Questions Concerning the Establishment on Territory
of the USSR in the Operation of Joint Ventures, International
Amalgamations and Organizations with the Participation of Soviet
and Foreign Organizations, Firms and Management Bodies," as well
as by any additional legislation enacted by the USSR and its con-
stituent union republics, subject to international and/or multilateral
or bilateral agreements to which the USSR has subjected itself.3
Approval of the proposed joint-ventures emanates from the Council
of Ministers and is further controlled and effected by the agreements
of the parties to the joint-ventures. Proposals for joint-ventures are
to be submitted by the prospective Soviet partner to the appropriate
ministries and government agdncies which control the organization.
In turn, the ministries and agencies in the Union Republics are
required to submit proposals to the Council of Ministers of the
respective Republics which, in turn, are required to obtain agreement
from the USSR State Planning Committee, the USSR Ministry of
Finance, and other appropriate ministries. Having obtained all the
foregoing approvals, the creation of joint-venture proposal is for-
warded to the USSR Council of Ministers for final approval. 4
All of the foregoing processes seem to have been recognized as
too cumbersome and were modified subsequent to the June 1987
Washington Conference to enable individual Soviet Ministries and
Departments and the Union Republic Councils of Ministers the right
to make decisions with respect to the joint-ventures, international
associations, and organizations.
The types of projects for which joint-ventures are sought include
those which would result in the output of various types of manufac-
2. The conference was held June 8th, 9th and 10th, 1987 in Washington, D.C. at the
International Law Institute and was ably co-chaired by Don Wallace, Jr., the Director of
International Law Institute, and Dr. Viktor Mozolin, Chief of the Sector of Civil Law, Institute
of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences.
3. Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, supra note 1, at 1. It should be noted that,
subsequent to the decree of January 13, 1987, the USSR Central Committee and the USSR
Council of Ministers adopted a resolution intended to address, in part, some of the shoitcomings
of the enabling decree. On Additional Measures for Improving Foreign Economic Activity
Under New Management Conditions, reprinted in 41 EKoNoMIcHE=sKYA GAZEm, October 1987
[hereinafter Additional Measures].
4. Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, supra note 1, at 1.
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tured products, the production of raw materials and food stuffs,
projects which would employ equipment with a "high-tech" com-
ponent, projects through which the Soviet economy receives the
benefit of exposure to foreign managerial expertise, projects which
serve to expand the export capabilities of the economy, and, by
correlation, those which reduce imports presently placing heavy de-
mands on the USSR's reserves of foreign currency.5
While the foregoing "shopping-list" of desired projects is quite
extensive, one factor of indispensable concern to the success or failure
of the joint-venture initiative will be the attitude of the United States
Department of Defense and the Departments (Ministries) of Defense
of the fellow COCOM member states with respect to the export
licensing process. Since a joint-venture is generally a long-term com-
mitment, such an investment will not appear attractive if a validated,
technical data export license is granted for a period not to exceed
two years, assuming that DOD will permit the issuance of the
technical data license at all. Furthermore, there is the additional
difficulty of obtaining the corresponding equipment licenses that will
certainly be necessary for many joint-ventures.
6
II. LEGAL CHARAcT=sTics oF TH JoiNT-VrENTuR
The law contemplates the joining of Soviet enterprises which are
"legal entities" and foreign firms, also required to be legal entities,
to form a partnership, which itself is to be recognized as a legal
entity under Soviet Law.7 These joint-venture entities are empowered
to contract, to enter into agreements which place them under contin-
uing economic obligations, to bring actions before appropriate courts
of justice and arbitral tribunals, and- to "acquire proprietary and
non-proprietary personal rights." This latter power, as to proprietary
and non-proprietary personal rights, is somewhat unique and requires
clarification.
Article Five of the decree provides that the Soviet interest in the
"authorized fund" of the joint venture is to be not less than fifty-
one percent. The notion of the host-nation retaining control over
joint-ventures is not unfamiliar to those firms having participated in
joint-ventures in less developed countries.
5. Additional Measures, supra note 3, at 3.
6. Letter from Thomas L. Shillinglaw, Division Counsel, Legal Depirtment of Coming
Glass Works to Karl Viehe (Sept. 16, 1987).
7. Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, supra note 1, at 1.
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The joint-venture is required to have what is termed a "statute"
approved by its partners. This statute is merely the partnership or
joint-venture agreement, and its required content includes the nature
and extent of the joint-venture, its objectives, its domiciliary address,
the names of the partners, the amount of the "authorized fund"
and the share interests therein of the partners, the procedure for
raising the capital which comprises the authorized fund (including,
specifically, the foreign-currency component of the authorized fund),
the organization of the fund's management, the decision-making
procedures to be followed, a statement of issues requiring unanimous
agreement, and the procedures to be followed in dissolving and
winding-up the joint-venture. In addition, the duration of the venture
may be stated in the agreement or by a separate agreement among
the partners.8
Once all of the formal approvals for the joint-venture proposal
have been obtained and the partnership agreement has been estab-
lished, the venture is required to register with the USSR Ministry of
Finance, at which time its status as a legal entity is established. The
decree states that a notification of the formation of the joint-venture
is to be published in the press but does not designate whose respon-
sibility it is to provide for the publication.9
The joint-venture is required to establish an "authorized fund,"
as noted above. This fund is analogous to the capital account of a
partnership familiar to Western practitioners. The joint-venture part-
ners provide contributions to the authorized fund, and the fund can
be maintained or enlarged through profits from the entity's operations
or through additional capital contributions. The capital contributed
to the fund by the partners of the joint-venture may be in the form
of cash; buildings and/or other structures; equipment; rights to the
use of land, water, and/or natural resources; rights to the use of
buildings, structures, and/or equipment; convertible and inconvertible
currencies, where appropriate; and other intangible property rights
such as patents, trademarks, copyrights, etc.' 0
One of the great difficulties with which the parties will be faced
arises out of the non-cash contributions of the parties. Article Twelve
of the decree provides that the contribution of the Soviet partner is
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due consideration to world market prices. First of all, even assuming
the parties could arrive at an agreement on the market value of non-
cash contributibns, giving due regard to world market prices, there
still would remain the question of what exchange rate to employ in
making a conversion from foreign currency-ag'reed prices to rubles.
As there are a limited number of reasonably practical exchange rates
to use, this latter problem should not be insurmountable. More
difficult, however, is the task of arriving at agreed-upon world prices
which reflect fair market value. Ultimately, indices based upon the
real purchasing power of labor units may have to be established in
order-that the sticky problem of valuing non-cash contributions may
be overcome.
Similar problems may arise with respect to the valuation of the
contribution of a foreign partner, particularly with respect to what
is to be deemed the official exchange rate to be employed in the
conversion to rubles. Valuation of non-cash contributions of the
foreign partner may be less difficult for those foreign partners which
transact business in convertible currencies; however, for those foreign
partners from countries with non-convertible currencies, the valuation
problem remains difficult. Article Twelve further provides that the
date of conversion of value to ruble terms is the date of the signing
of the joint-venture agreement or such date as the parties may agree
upon. It is also provided that, where world market prices cannot
readily be determined, the parties may determine value by agreement.
These latter provisions may prove to be the escape mechanism for
the valuation problem. It is not difficult to imagine that, for projects
which are deemed important by the appropriate authorities, the issue
of valuation can be readily overcome through these latter provisions.
Article Thirteen provides that any equipment, materials, and/or
other property required to be imported into the USSR by the foreign
partner in a joint-venture as a contribution to capital in the venture
will not be subject to customs duties. Furthermore, the western
-partner in the prospective joint-venture has flexibility in valuing its
assets, particularly in the area of transferred technology, although
there are limits to the extent that the assets are readily marketable,
in which case market values can easily be established, thereby limiting
the flexibility in valuation.
The decree requires that the property of the joint-venture be
compulsorily insured with insurance agencies of the USSR. It is
interesting .to note that this requirement for insurance is not part of
the founding contract of the joint-venture agreement, but is a legal
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requirement. It is unclear, however, whether the joint-venture entity
itself, as a property interest, is required to be insured and, further-
more, whether the joint-venture is required to obtain liability insur-
ance, notwithstanding the fact that liability insurance is presently
unavailable in the Soviet Union. Given the rather undeveloped state
of Soviet law with respect to limited liability, in particular, and,
generally, the nascent state of Soviet practice regarding insurability
against liability, the prospective joint-venture partner needs to give
careful consideration to the entire matter of insurance. Practically
speaking, counsel familiar with international insurance practice should
be retained to assure that the coverage in place is adequate.
Article Fifteen of the decree of January 13, 1987 states that the
joint-venture will be entitled, pursuant to law applicable to it as a
juridical entity, to "own, use and dispose of its property" consistent
with the purposes for which it was established and the intended
purpose of the property. The provision goes on further to state that
the property of the joint-venture is not to be requisitioned or con-
fiscated by administrative order. Moreover, the rights and property
of the joint-venture are to be protected by legislation which currently
provides protection for state-owned Soviet enterprises. Execution,
which presumably conveys the notion of a "taking," is enabled by
the decision of appropriate bodies empowered under Soviet legislation
to resolve disputes arising out of the conduct of the joint-venture."
As will become clearer, infra, the notions of use and disposition of
property by the joint-venture noted in Article Fifteen are similar in
some aspects to the treatment of property in a partnership context
in western practice, but, nevertheless, differ from the concept of
property held in a joint-venture between western commercial entities.
One of the more interesting aspects of the joint-venture law is
found in Article Sixteen, which provides for the assignment of shares
in the joint-venture by the venturers in whole or in part to third
parties by "common consent." The concept of common consent is
somewhat ambiguous. For instance, the most plausible interpretation
of the concept would be that unanimous consent is required. How-
ever, it may be that, where there are more than two parties to a
joint-venture, a majority of the venturers may be willing to approve
the assignment, but the requirement of unanimity would bar the
result. In western partnership practice, a partnership agreement can
I1. Id. at 2.
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provide either for the unanimous approval of the partners as to an
assignment by one of them or for approval by a majority of the
partners. Because of the joint and several liability of the partners
arising with respect to the partnership's activities, requirements of
unanimity may be prudent even for the mere assignment of a part-
nership interest and, perhaps, even more strongly recommended in
the case where there is to be a transfer of the property of the
partnership interest.
Certainly the concept of common consent needs to be satisfactorily
clarified in any joint-venture agreement. Notwithstanding common
consent, the assignment is not wholly effective until it has been
subjected to the endorsement of the State Foreign and Economic
Commission of the Soviet Council of Ministers. Furthermore, the
provisions of Article Fifteen contemplate the Soviet partners having
a "right of first refusal" to acquire the assigned shares.
The provision also seems to contemplate an event analogous to
the dissolution of a partnership, in which case the rights and obli-
gations of the joint-venture "pass to the assignees."
From the foregoing, it is clear that the concept of a property right
obtained by the joint-venturers falls somewhat short of the notion
of a partnership interest obtained by a co-venturer in western practice.
In western practice, the concept of an assignment speaks to the
transfer of something less than a party's full right, title, and interest
(in the current context, a partnership interest). Transfer of the
partnership interest, in contrast to an assigment, however, conveys
all right, title, and interest which the co-venturer has in the partner-
ship, thereby divesting the co-venturer of not only any right, title,
and interest which that venturer may have in the partnership interest
but also any right, title, and interest which that venturer may have
in the underlying partnership property in the event of a dissolution.
2
The joint-venture decree provides that all industrial property of
the ventures, including patents, are to be protected by Soviet law.
The law goes on to state that the joint-venture agreement itself shall
specify the procedure by which partners transfer property and/or
property rights to the joint-venture. 3
*Article Eighteen provides some seemingly contradictory statements
about the liabilities of a joint-venture. It starts out by indicating that
the joint-venture is liable for fulfilling its obligations, presumably to
12. Id.
13. Id,
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the extent of its property. 14 The provision then goes on to indicate
that the Soviet state is not liable for the obligations of the entity
but, then, neither are the partners in the venture. This would seem
to provide for the entity the status of a corporation with the share-
holders being liable only to the extent of their share of the capital.
In this sense, the proposed entity is somewhat different than that
normally associated with a joint-venture, since the concept of a
venture as a partnership normally implies that the partners shall be
jointly and severally liable for the obligations of the entity beyond
that of the respective capital contributions of the partners.
The law provides that the joint-venture has no liability for obli-
gations ofdthe Soviet state nor for the liabilities of individual partners
in the venture.
Furthermore, should the joint-venture establish affiliates within the
USSR, those affiliates are themselves legal entities and do not impose
liability as to their obligations on the joint-venture and, likewise,
such affiliates are not liable for the obligations of the joint-venture.
Thus, the affiliates are quite analogous to subsidiaries of western
corporate practice. 15
The establishment of affiliates and/or representational offices within
the territory of the Soviet Union is permitted, but the right to so
esta'blish affiliates must be provided for in the joint-venture agreement
(foundation documents). 16
The law goes on to provide a dispute resolution mechanism re-
quiring that, where the joint-venture and a Soviet state-owned entity,
cooperative, or other public organization find themselves in a dispute,
or where the joint-venturers themselves become embroiled in a dispute
with respect to matters arising out of the joint-venture activity, or
where two or more joint-ventures find themselves in a dispute, the
matter shall be settled consistent with Soviet legislation by the Soviet
judicial system or, where third parties consent, by submission to an
appropriate arbitration tribunal.
This system of resolution of disputes needs to be very carefully
considered by tle western partners in the joint-venture. First and
foremost would be consideration as to whether or not an agreement
to arbitrate would be given effect by the Soviet judicial system in
14. Id. The section reads "[a] joint-venture shall be liable on its obligations in all of its




1988 / Joint-Ventures in the Soviet Union
the event a significant dispute arose. Second, a prospective venturer
should be well apprised of the perils of submitting a dispute to
arbitration under Soviet practice. Third, it certainly would seem to
be highly desirable to have matters with respect to disputes covered
in the joint-venture agreement with the inclusion of, where appro-
priate, arbitration clauses, choice-of-fora clauses, and choice-of-laws
clauses.
The Soviets, in the past, have submitted to international arbitration
in Sweden in accordance with the International Chamber of Com-
merce rules on arbitration, and it would certainly seem that disputes
between joint-venture partners would be treated as international
disputes and, therefore, proper for submission to international ar-
bitration. Nevertheless, prospective partners are well advised to pro-
ceed with caution in formulating contract provisions covering the
matter of dispute resolution.
III. PRoCr EDT S AND PRACTICES FOR OPERATNG JoMn-VENTnRs
The law provides that the equivalent of the board of directors of
the joint-venture, which is termed the "governing body," is consti-
tuted by an appointment by the partners. The chairman of the
governing body and the director general of the joint-venture, i.e.,
the operating manager, are required to be Soviet citizens.
It is anticipated that the operational management of the joint-
venture will consist of both Soviet citizens and foreign nationals.
The procedures for the board to follow in its decision-making are
to be specified in the joint-venture agreement.' 7
The law requires that the joint-venture entity establish relations
with the appropriate central authorities of the Soviet government and
the respective governments of the Union Republics by intermediate
authorities superior to the Soviet venture partner, which, presumably,
means through the ministry to which the Soviet partner is responsible.
On the other hand, the entity is empowered to contact local govern-
mental authorities directly.
The law provides that the joint-venture entity is to have full
freedom in establishing its plan of operations and that no Soviet
state planning organization shall establish a mandatory plan in lim-
itation of the joint-venture's freedom of operation. On the other
hand, the law provides that no state-planning organization shall
17. Id.
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provide a guaranteed market for the joint-venture's products.,, Fur-
thermore, in accordance with the decree, the joint-venture has full
freedom with respect to entering into contracts for export and import
activities necessary to its business operations, including the authority
to conduct export and import operations in furtherance of its business
with members of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance. These
provisions seem to permit the direct contracting for the requisite
export and import operations. The law goes on to state that export
and import operations may also be conducted with the assistance of
Soviet foreign trade organizations or through contracting with mar-
keting networks of foreign partners.
The shipment of the output of the joint-venture is to be done
pursuant to a license issued by the government in accord with
appropriate legislation.
The law entitles the joint-venture to correspond freely with organ-
izations in other countries as well as to maintain telegraph, teletype,
and telephone communications.1 9
One aspect of the joint-venture law that is of particular importance
to prospective venturers is that provided in Article Twenty-five.
Because of its importance, Article Twenty-five is quoted in full: "25.
All foreign currency expenditures of a joint-venture, including trans-
fer of profits and other funds due to foreign partners and specialists,
shall be covered by proceeds from the sales of the joint-venture's
products on foreign markets. '20
The first point to be made in connection with this article is that
the repatriation of profits is enabled only to the extent that "pro-
ceeds" are available from the sales of the joint-venture's products
on foreign markets.
The second point to be noted is that, if the products to be
manufactured require a substantial component of imported materials
or subassemblies, payment for said subassemblies must also be cov-




20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. The foreign exchange needs covered by this article can be substantial, including
machinery, spare parts, foreign employees' salaries, debt service, royalty payments to the
foreign partner for its technology, and, alternatively, dividend repatriation. The time for the
venture to make inroads into western markets sufficient to provide foreign exchange needs
may be of too long a duration for it to cover effectively its foreign exchange operational
needs in the start-up phase.
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Article Twenty-five does not contemplate the possibility of a joint-
venture generating exchange by selling domestically to foreign trade
organizations for foreign exchange. This latter point envisions the
joint-venture selling its product to foreign trade organizations and
receiving foreign exchange in payment. Furthermore, certainly most
ventures would like to be able to sell directly to the Soviet market
for rubles and convert those rubles to foreign exchange upon the
theory that these latter direct sales were import substitutions; that
is, a sale that the Soviet buyer otherwise would have had to have
made abroad in exchange for convertible currency.
The joint-ventures also seem not to have the ability to trade foreign
exchange among #hemselves upon agreed-upon bases. That is, for
instance, a foreign exchange-rich venture might wish to sell some of
its foreign exchange to 4 joint venture lacking sufficient foreign
currency. Therefore, it is quite possible that, under the latter circum-
stances noted above, proceeds may not be available to provide for
the repatriation of profits. Furthermore, as will be noted below,
there is also a remittance tax on repatriated profits.
The net effect of this.provision should be to cause venturers to
focus on production of products for sale in foreign markets and, at
the same time, to minimize the use of foreign resources and materials
and subassemblies in order to maximize the dollars available to be
deemed "proceeds from foreign sales" to provide for the repatriation
of profits.?
Article Twenty-six may be a source of disappointment for many
prospective partners in that it requires sales of products resulting
from the joint-venture to be channeled to the Soviet market through
the appropriate foreign trade organization. Certainly, one of the
magnets for any prospective partner in the Soviet Union is the
magnitude of its market, with reasonably widespread mass media
available in furtherance of marketing prospects. However, this ina-
bility to participate directly in the marketing of the venture's products
will prove unattractive for many types of enterprise. Certainly, this
will be true in terms of production in the consumer sector, although
it may be less a problem in the raw materials and industrial sectors
of the economy. While subject to the limitations noted above, the
joint-venture entity has the freedom to purchase raw materials and
other subassemblies from international markets. However, supplies
22. Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, supra note 1, at 2.
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of such from the domestic market are required to be channeled
through the appropriate Soviet foreign trade organization. This may
create problems for the venture.
Moreover, materials purchased through the Soviet foreign trade
organizations must be paid for in rubles pursuant to prices established
by contract, but these prices are required to be established with "due
regard to world market prices." 23 Requiring the contractual prices to
be established with "due regard" to world market prices may neces-
sitate a price structure which results in the price of the final product
not being competitive internationally.
Clearly, one of the reasons for a western firm considering a joint-
venture would be to take advantage of attractive wage differentials.
If raw materials and subassemblies are arbitrarily increased in price
to world market levels, the advantages quickly diminish.
Article Twenty-seven provides that the joint-venture may obtain
credits on what is termed "commercial terms." Foreign exchange
may be obtained from the Soviet Bank for Foreign Trade or, upon
obtaining the consent of this latter bank, from foreign banks and
other institutions. Capital needs, in ruble terms, may be obtained on
credit from the USSR State Bank or the USSR Bank for Foreign
Trade.
Both the US.SR State Bank and the USSR Bank for Foreign Trade
have the authority to monitor the use of funds provided under the
credit agreement, to require appropriate security, and to require
timely repayment of the monies loaned.24 Cash assets of the joint-
venture denominated in rubles must be deposited in a ruble account
with the USSR State Bank, while cash assets denominated in foreign
currency must be deposited with the USSR Bank for Foreign Trade.
Article Twenty-nine provides that the foreign currency accounts
shall be interest-bearing with reference to international monetary
rates, while the ruble accounts are to bear interest on terms to be
specified by the USSR State Bank. The gains or losses which arise
on the foreign currency accounts of the joint-ventures are required
to be reflected currently on the entity's operating statement ("profit
and loss accounts"). 2
One provision which is apt to cause some concern is Article Thirty,
which requires the joint-venture to set aside from its operating profits,
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 2-3.
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monies which are to form a "reserve fund" and additional funds,
presumably denoted as segregated accounts, sufficient to provide for
its costs of operation and for the "social .needs of its personnel."
Thus, the provision seems to 'require the establishment of three
separate line item. accounts which might' be termed the "reserve
fund;" the ":operating account," ,and the "social fund." While the
annual contribution. to these funds are, to be agreed-upon:.and
incorporated in the joint-venture agreement, the amount required to
be channeled, into the reserve fund must amount to a total of twenty-
five percent of the authorized capital of-the joint-venture. 20,
- Several observations, are in order. First of all, the decree seems to
provide no indicationof what is'to become of amounts contained in
the funds upon liquidation of the venture. Sedond,--it might have
been advantageous to have the required amounts be structured. as
taxes'in-order that; where appropriate, they be creditable as foreign
taxes-paid .in the foreign partner's home jurisdiction.
The law provides that the profits of the joint-venture are to be
distributed among the venture partners-in 1roportion to each partner's
share in th6 venture's capital account (authorized fund) after deduc-
tion from profits of amounts to be paid,into the .USSR National
Treasury as taxes -and payment of sums necessary to establish the
joint-venture's capital account or,-where-.appropriate, -to replenish
said account-.27
In regard to this provision, it might have been better if the drafter
had provided some flexibility by permitting an incentive preferential
return to appropriate parties under certain circumstances. Certainly,
such .a result..could have been rather easily included by adding to the
words "funds shall be distributed among the partners in proportion
to eachpartner's sfiare in the authorized fund" or the phrase "or.
in such manner as the partners shall agree."
•Article Thirtyrtwo of the decree seems to be somewhat contradic-
tory, certainly..in spirit if not in fact, to the provisions of Article
Twenty-five. Simply stated, Article Thirty-two guarantees that the
foreign -partners may repatriate their share in the distributive profits
of t1e.venture .vithout restriction. However, as noted above, Article
Twenty-five seems to permit the transfer of profit only to the extent
that proceeds. are. available from the sales of products on foreign
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id.
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markets. Certainly, any prospective partner will want to have this
point clarified.
An interesting provision arises under Article Thirty-three, wherein
it is stated that joint-ventures shall make depreciation payments in a
manner similar to that of state-owned organizations. This provision
seems to require a payment into an account pro rata to the extent
of depreciation of the venture's capital assets. Western firms, how-
ever, normally consider depreciation to be a cost of business from
which they obtain a tax savings and the idea of paying into a
depreciation account will not be appealing.
However, it must be noted that the law does provide that the
joint-venture agreement can provide for a different method of ac-
counting for depreciation, and certainly western partners will want
to reflect generally accepted accounting principles.u
The law provides that design and construction of the facilities,
both for operating and social purposes, are to be paid for by the
venture itself either out of its own capital or with borrowed funds.
The USSR State Building Committee is to establish a procedure for
the approval of building designs in connection with the joint-venture,
and the needs of the joint-venture in connection with this construc-
tion, both as to labor and materials, are to be given priority. 29 The
law .'also provides that the transportation of products of the joint-
venture will be in accord with the procedures followed by Soviet
domestic enterprises.
IV. TAx TREATMENT oF THE JOMT-VENTUpE ENTiTY
Unlike the U.S. practice of taxation of joint-ventures, where the
venture partnership generally is a "conduit," Article Thirty-six of
the decree of January 13, 1987 provides for "entity" treatment of
the joint-venture.
Although the article provides no definitive statement of how the
concept of profit is to be arrived at nor any accounting guidelines
to determine profit, the tax rate applied to profits of the 'joint-
venture is thirty percent of the profits which remain after allowance
for the required contribution to the reserve and the provision for
funds to be used for capital construction ("development of produc-
tion") and research and development ("science and technology").
The aforementioned tax is paid at the national level.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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Initially, the law provided a tax holiday for the joint-venture,
exempting it from the aforementioned tax on profits for the first
two years of operation. Practically speaking, however, very few
ventures, particularly those involving large start-up costs, will have
any profits to exempt in the first two years. The provision for the
tax relief would have been far more attractive if, consistent with
incentive tax holiday programs employed in western practice, the
period of forbearance from taxation encompassed a span of time of
from four to ten years, depending on the nature of the venture.3 0
Article Thirty-six does provide for some flexibility in that the
USSR Ministry of Finance is empowered to levy a reduced rate or
to eliminate the tax on the joint-venture. Although the intent of the
provision is somewhat unclear, it appears also that the Ministry of
Finance has the power selectively to eliminate the tax on joint-venture
partners. 31 The decree of 'January 13, 1987 provides that the joint-
venture itself is responsible for the determination of the tax due on
profits. The law requires that the entity determine an "advance tax
payment" for its current operating year based upon its best estimate
of its financial plan for that year. Furthermore, the joint-venture is
required to make a determination of the total tax payable no later
than the fifteenth of March of the year following the current fiscal
year. Appropriate financial authorities within the Soviet government
are authorized to review the determination made by the entity. The
tax for the current year is required to be paid to the government in
equal installments, similar to the estimated quarterly tax payments
required of an American business, not later than fifteen days prior
to the end of the quarter. The balance, if any, is to be paid on or
before the first of April of the year following the then-current year.
In the event the predetermined tax results in an overpayment for the
year, the amount overpaid can be refunded or credited against taxes
payable for the following year.
In the event there is a delay in transferring payment to the
government for the taxes due, a penalty is assessed at the rate of
five one-hundredths of one percent for each and every day of delay,
which compounds to an annual penalty of twenty-five percent. 32 A
30. Additional Measures, supra note , at 3, alters the parallel provisions in the Decree
of the Council of Ministers, supra note 1, at 2, stating, "In order to increase involvement on
the part of foreign partners in the creation of joint-ventures on Soviet territory, it is deemed
practicable to exempt these enterprises from payment of taxes on profits over a period of two
_years from the time they receive their first declared profits." (emphasis added).
31. See generally, Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, supra note I, at 3.
32. Id.
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procedure is stated for the collection of taxes not timely transferred,
which presumably applies to the foreign partners of the venture. 33
Article Forty provides a right of appeal on the part of the joint-
venture to actions of the financial authorities concerning any matter
of tax collection. The appeal is required to be filed with the authority
charged with -verification of the tax computation. The law piovides
that the appeal shall be decided within thirty days of its filing. In
the -event of an adverse determination .at the level of-the first appeal,
the entity is entitled to a further appeal to an appropriate superior
financial authority, assuming the appeal is filed within one month
from the day of the adverse ruling. Notwithstanding the fact that an
appeal is filed or to be filed, the entity must pay the tax due.3
The foreign partner in -the joint-venture -faces a repatriation of
profits tax in the amount -of twenty percent unless there is. a tax
treaty in effect between its domiciliary state and the USSR. Recall
that profits cannot be transferred -unless and until there are sufficient
proceeds from the sales of the joint-venture's product on foreign
markets. 35
Two interesting questions arise with regard to the provisions of
Article Forty-one. The first is, in which currency must the repatriation
of profits tax be paid? For instance, there may be sufficient proceeds
for the payment of the eighty percent of the profits which a foreign
partner desires to repatriate but not for the additional twenty percent
due as tax. So, the question arises as to whether that twenty percent
can be paid in rubles. The second question concerns whether the
portion of profits desired to be repatriated by a foreign partner are
profits stated in ruble terms or in hard currency. Furthermore, there
is a question as to whether the hard currency has to be that of the
repatriating partner or whether it might be a hard currency profit
resulting from a sale in other markets.
The tax regimen outlined above is effective for joint-ventures which
are established in the territory of the USSR and also for affiliates
of joint-ventures which are located in the USSR, where such affiliates
are established with the participation of Soviet enterprises and/or
other organizations. For these latter entities the reach of the tax
33. Rules on Collection of Delayed Taxes and Non-Tax Payments, Ved. Verkh. Sov.
SSSR, 1981, No. 5, art. 122 (Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR,
dated January 26, "198i, establishing a procedure for the collection of taxes from foreign legal
persons). -
34. Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, supra note 1, at 3.
35. Id.
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statutes is both to profits produced within the Soviet Union including
its continental shelf and to profits arising from operations in other
countries. Thus, the thrust of the tax scheme is to provide for the
taxation of world-wide profits (income).36 It is interesting to note
that nothing in the general policy statement of the decree of January
13 explicitly or implicitly indicates the aim. to encourage active
manufacturing operations such as is found .in the U.S. provisions for
taxing foreign source income of corporations, but this may merely
be a reflection of the fact that there will not be relatively free entry
into the marketplace. Nevertheless, it might seem worthwhile for the
USSR Ministry of Finance, in developing its implementing regula-
tions,37 to give some thought to structuring the taxation of ventures
in such a way as to .provide incentives for the. entry of partners in
the lines of activity for which there is particular, interest.
V. ADInImSTRATIVE PROCEDURES FOR SUPERVISING JOINT-VENTRE
OPERATIONS
The law requires that the joint-venture agreement provide for a
flow of' information to the partners in order to provide them with
the facts necessaiy for decision-making with respect to all aspects of
its operations and the status of its balance sheet and operating
statements. The joint-venture -agreement may provide for the insti-
tution of an auditing procedure for the continuous monitoring of
the venture's accounts. 38
A problem which looms on the horizon is the requirement that
the joint-venture maintain its business, bookkeeping, and statistical
records of account in' a manner consistent with that for Soviet state-
owned enterprises. This is quite likely.to result in a necessity for the
foreign partner to maintain two sets of books. Furthermore, this is
particularly true for publicly-held foreign partners. No clear proce-
dures are provided for dealing with any domestic requirements im-
posed on the foreign paitner for' certified statements prepared by
independent auditors iior for the filing 'requirements necessary in
connection with the securities regulations of foreign jurisdictions.
Also, it is uncleai whether the 'foreign partner 'would be able to
36. Id. While Article 42 provides that the tax procedure applies to "income," it seems
fairly clear that the intention is to tax profits as noted in Article 36. See supra text accompanying
note 33.
37. Id. at 3.
38. Id.
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provide information on the venture pursuant to a court order (or,
for that matter, arising in the course of ordinary discovery proceed-
ings) from a court outside the Soviet Union.
The USSR Ministry of Finance and the Central Board of Statistics
are charged with the responsibility of developing accounting and
bookkeeping requirements and, clearly, it will be worthwhile for them
to focus on the aforementioned issues.
The need for clarification of these issues is particularly apparent
in light of the provision that a "joint-venture shall not submit any
accounting or business information to the state or other authorities
of foreign countries. ' 3 9 On the face of it, the foregoing provision
would render participation by any American firm untenable in that
even non-public firms would have the requirement to provide ac-
counting information to state and federal tax authorities. Superfi-
cially, at least, the "out" for the Ministry of Finance might be that
the provisions of Article Forty-five prohibit the direct submission of
information by the joint-venture, but do not prohibit the submission
of appropriate information by the joint-venture to the foreign partner
with the foreign partner then able to transmit that information in
accord with its domestic filing requirements. However, even accepting
such a tenuous interpretation of the wording, it is not difficult to
conceive of a situation in which, under a tax audit of the foreign
pariner by the foreign partner's domiciliary government, the need
would arise for the submission of verifying information directly from
the joint-venture entity. Some clarification with regard to the fore-
going issues is necessary.
The joint-venture itself is charged with the responsibility for main-
taining its accounting records and for having bookkeeping procedures
in place which result in true and accurate records. However, the law
provides for audit of the joint-venture's activities by an appropriate
Soviet auditing organization with appropriate fees to be paid to the
auditing organization. 4° If this provision becomes mandatory, it may
lead to a duplication of effort which may prove burdensome to the
venture in general and, more particularly, to the foreign partner
which, in any event, will want to provide for its own audit in
fulfillment of its domestic reporting requirements.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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VI. PERSONNEL ISSUES FOR TBE JOINT-VENTURE
Certainly one of the key areas of uncertainty to be faced by the
foreign partner is its ability to deal with the Soviet labor force.
Assuming that appropriate relationships can be established in the
context of the joint-venture agreement and that agreements can be
reached with the appropriate trade union organizations, the experi-
ence with Soviet labor may not prove to be too unfavorable if it
follows the pattern occurring in ventures employing host country
nationals in Poland and Hungary. However, practically speaking, it
is certainly far from clear at the outset that the trade union organ-
izations will be willing to accommodate the realities of operating a
business enterprise in a commercially feasible manner.
Article Forty-seven of the decree provides that there is to be a
predominance of Soviet labor employed by the joint-venture. The
joint-venture agreement together with the provisions of Soviet social
legislation will have a profound impact on the content of the agree-
ments reached with the appropriate trade union organizations. 41 At
the outset, the process will be somewhat tenuous until sufficient
precedent has accumulated to provide guidance for negotiating such
agreements.
The terms and conditions of employment of the workforce, 'not
surprisingly, are to be controlled by regulations issued pursuant to
Soviet legislation. These- regulations will encompass the pay scales,
scheduling of work, the provision for recreation, the provision of
social security, and social insurance for the Soviet citizens employed
by the joint-venture. The law also provides that various aspects of
the terms and conditions of work for foreign citizens employed by
the joint-venture shall be controlled by regulations issued pursuant
to Soviet legislation. Matters of pay schedules, leaves, and pensions
are to be established on a case-by-case basis as reflected in contracts
signed with each of the foreign employees. 42 The decree, however, is
unclear as to which parties are to be signatories to the contracts with
the foreign employees.
The law states that the USSR State Committee for Labor and
Social Affairs and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions
are empowered to provide the rules and are to develop regulations
41. Id. at 4.
42. Id.
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to provide social insurance coverage for the joint-venture's foreign
employees. 43
Article Forty-nine requires the joint-venture to make contributions
to the national budget in amounts sufficient to pay both the costs
of state-sponsored social insurance for both the Soviet and foreign
employees and the costs of pensions for Soviet employees as deter-
mined by the appropriate state organizations.M It is quite unclear at
this time whether these amounts bear any relationship to the reserve
fund requirements stated in Article Thirty of the decree of January
13, 1987.
One very specific -provision of Article Forty-nine is that contribu-
tions made by the joint-venture to the foreign employees' pension
plans are required to be transferred to the employees' domiciliary
country, with the transfer to be in the currency of that country.45
The joint-venture's foreign employees are subject to ai income tax
as provided under Soviet law.46 The part of the foreign employee's
pay which is saved may be repatriated in foreign 6urrency and, in
fact, the law seems to permit it to be transferred anywhere abroad.47
VII. LiQuiDATIoN OF THE Jonr-VENTuRE ENnn',
The decree provides that there are several procedures by which the
joint-venture can be terminated. First of all, the joint-venture agree-
ment may provide the types of events which result in termination
and the procedures to be followed to terminate. In addition, the
Council of Ministers may order a termination if the activities of the
joint-venture are not consistent with its objectives as defined in the
joint-venture agreement. Public disclosure of the liquidation of the
joint-venture is required; however, it is not .clear whether such
publication is to be made prior to the liquidation or ex post facto.48
One of the areas of greatest uncertainty in connection with the
decree is the distribution of monies upon liquidation. The provision
is that: "The foreign partner shall have the right to return his
contribution in money or in kind pro rata to the residual balance of
43. Id.
44. Id. See supra text accompanying note 28.
45. Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, supra note 1, at 4.
46. See On the Income Tax Levied on Foreign Legal and Physical Persons, Ved. Verkh.
Soy. SSSR, 1978, No. 20, art. 313 (Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR dated May 12, 1978).
47. Decree of USSR Council of Ministers, supra note 1, at 4.
48. Id.
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his contribution at the moment of liquidation of the joint-venture,
after discharging his- obligations to the Soviet partners- and third
parties. ' 49  -
The first question which arises concerns the concept of the "resid-
ual balance." Presumably, what should happen -in the liquidation is
that the joint-venture discharges all of its obligations incurred as an
entity, providing some amount which might be termed a "residual
balance"- against which there may be required offsets to adjust the
accounts for any obligations which may. exist between or among. the
parties. Another question arises, as noted above, with respect to
what part the reserve fund plays in arriving at the value of a residual
balance. Another issue which might also be -considered is, in the
event the joint-venture is unsuccessful and the remaining obligations
are such that the residual balance is negative, -what are the respon-
sibilities of a foreign partner, and how would the responsible Soviet
authorities deal with the situation if a bankruptcy. of the foreign
partner were to be precipitated by that partner's obligation on the
negative -residual balance?
As a final matter, the decree- requires that the liquidation is to be
registered with the USSR Ministry of Finance upon its completion.
This, of course, is not unfamiliar to western practice, since most
corporate entities are required to file a notice of dissolutior upon
the termination of the corporate entity.
VIII. SUMMARY
First, th venture in which- the- foreign partner would be entering
is, in many resfpects, like a partnership interest in that, on the whole,
it appeafs to be relatively illiquiid. No real safeguards 'exist in the
way of a limitation on liability; and the partner's initerest is subject
to limitations on transferability and to rights of firit refusal. Addi-
tionally, the obligations of the joint-venture partners in a liquidation
seem to parallel those of pirtneri in the'liquidation of a partnership.
.On the other hand, from the point of view of its taxation, .the
joint-venture .entity seems to be more corporate in- form, in that it
is given entity rather.than.conduit treatment; that is, a tax is levied
against the entity rather than the.pro-rata share of profits -passing
through to .the respective- partners -to be taxed only .at the partner's
personal (corporate) rate of taxation. While restrictions on share-
49.-Id;
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holders such as those found in the joint-venture law are not uncom-
mon, the shares received by a foreign partner in a joint-venture seem
to have few of the characteristics required by the western notion of
title. Perhaps one of the more useful ways to characterize the interest
that the western partner receives is as a leasehold interest in the
shares of the enterprise subject to a requirement for capital contri-
butions under appropriate terms and conditions.
A second point to be considered is that the thrust of the joint-
venture law as it is now structured seems inevitably to focus the
productive efforts of the joint-venture on goods and services which
will be exported from the Soviet Union, ultimately resulting in the
earning of hard currency which can then be repatriated, subject to
stated limitations.
A third factor to be considered is the inability of the joint-venture
entity to sell directly to the Soviet market. Unless implementing
regulations issued pursuant tc the decree provide a rather creative
way of overcoming this problem, this provision is apt to be the single
most dissuasive element in the joint-venture package. Certainly, many
western firms look at the Soviet market as one which holds a great
deal of potential.
A fourth point is that the decree of January 13, 1987 provides
only the skeleton of the law by which the joint-venture program will
be controlled. There is a fair amount of flexibility built into the
decree, and the implementing rules and regulations as they are
formulated may shed some light on a few of the areas of uncertainty
identified in the analysis above. Furthermore, as some of the larger
and better connected western firms enter into joint-ventures requiring
political solutions to practical problems arising under the decree,
precedents will be established which will be useful in formulating
subsequent ventures.
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS
It is the opinion of this author that the joint-venture reforms, as
instituted, are an interesting first step. It is clear that the law reflects
the remaining distrust of the private holding of productive capital.
This author believes that the fear of placing productive capital in
private hands does not reflect a shrewd assessment of the dynamics
of political economy of recent western experience. A noteworthy
example is the ability of the political processes to disembody the
single largest industrial corporation in the Western world, i.e., Amer-
ican Telephone and Telegraph, and to dismantle the $149 billion
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entity into six separate companies (whether that was a wise result
will be left for the reader to decide). The very fact that such was
accomplished when'the political will deemed it appropriate ought to
shed some light on the putative "indominability" of corporate capital
in the political process.
A simple and far less bureaucratic approach to attracting foreign
capital and skill might involve a multi-pronged policy including:
1. The creation of foreign enterprise zones;
2. the authorization of long-term leases of real property, both
within and without such enterprise zones;
3. the authorization of leases of appropriate terms on the tools
and equipment necessary for operating businesses;
4. the establishment of appropriate "domestic content" provisions;
5. the requirement for the training and employment of Soviet
citizens in appropriate proportions; and,
6. the authorization of entities to employ personnel up to some
appropriate numerical level.
None of the foregoing suggestions would violate the basic tenets
of the social system vis-A-vis individual and property rights and all
of the foregoing would have been much simpler to implement from
a regulatory point of view. Furthermore, it is the belief of this author
that many more western enterprises would find the Soviet market
attractive with such a scheme, particularly since the start-up capital
costs for ventures would be far less than under the joint-venture law
as now contemplated.

